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Comments on the Roundtable
Discussion of Choice of Law
by Russell J. Weintraub*
I.

INTRODUCTION

I congratulate the Walter F. George School of Law for bringing
together a distinguished group of conflict-of-laws scholars to discuss
some of the best known cases in the field. There is no better way to
honor Brainerd Currie of whom the School is justifiably proud as a
former student and faculty member. Although, as Professor Currie
freely acknowledged,' he was not the first to argue that the territorial
reach of a law should depend on the law's content and purpose, his
series of carefully wrought articles endowed the concept such intellectual
force that it could no longer be ignored. Within five years of the
publication of the first article in the series, the New York Court of
Appeals abandoned the place-of-wrong rule in torts.' The court chose
law by a "[c]omparison of the relative 'contacts' and 'interests"'3 of the
two jurisdictions involved and cited Professor Currie for his "criticism of
the traditional rule."4
The comments of members of the Mercer Roundtable and the audience
present useful insights into the choice-of-law process. My remarks focus
on some of the many interesting issues raised by the participants. For
convenience, this Article follows the order of the Roundtable discussion
and uses as headings the same cases analyzed by the participants.
* Professor of Law and Holder of the John B. Connally Chair in Civil Jurisprudence,
University of Texas School of Law. New York University (B.A., 1950); Harvard University
(J.D., 1953).
1. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 235 n.18 (1958) (citing a 1946 article by Paul Freund and
a 1943 article by Moffatt Hancock).
2. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
3. Id. at 284.
4. Id. at 281.
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II.

WALTON V. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO. 5

The issue on which the Roundtable discussion focused was the same
issue raised by Brainerd Currie in his discussion of the case: if neither
party contends that the law of the forum should be displaced with Saudi
Arabian law, should the judge raise this issue on his own motion and
dismiss the complaint when plaintiff does not prove the content of Saudi
law?6 I agree with Professor Currie that a court should apply forum
law unless one of the parties shows, with whatever modern procedures
are available, 7 that the law of another jurisdiction is different from that
of the forum and that a proper choice-of-law analysis displaces forum
law with foreign law.8 It is easier to justify this position when the
forum's contacts with the parties and the transaction trigger the policies
underlying forum law. Even in rare circumstances when the forum will
not bear the long-range consequences of the choice of law, forum law
should apply if no other law is shown to be different and relevant.
Perhaps the best justification for this position is Chief Justice Vanderbilt's statement in Leary v. Gledhill' that the parties "acquiesce in the
application of the law of the forum.""0
Several of the Roundtable members disagreed with this position, at
least when the defendant objects to the application of forum law and the
forum has no "interest" in the application of its law. Professor David
Currie agrees with the position of Larry Kramer that "it's up to the
plaintiff to point to some law that gives a right to relief"' and states
that New York cannot give a right because New York has insufficient
contacts with the parties or the transaction to trigger New York's

5. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956). Plaintiff, an Arkansas citizen, was injured when the
automobile he was driving collided in Saudi Arabia with a truck owned by defendant and
driven by one of its employees. Plaintiff was temporarily in Saudi Arabia, Defendant,
incorporated in Delaware and licensed to do business in New York, conducted most of its
activities in Saudi Arabia.
6. See Brainerd Currie, Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964,
965 (1958); Transcript, Choice of Law: How It Ought to Be, 48 MERCER L. REV. 639, 644-45
(1997).
7.

See, e.g., UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT

§§

4.01-4.04, 13

U.L.A. 355, 394-97 (1986) (stating that a party shall give reasonable written notice of an
intention to raise an issue concerning the law of another jurisdiction and permitting the
court to consider any relevant material in determining the law of that jurisdiction).
8. See Currie, supra note 6, at 1027.
9. 84 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1951).
10. Id. at 729.
11. Transcript, supra note 6, at 649. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990) (stating that if "no state gives plaintiff a right to recover
...plaintiff has no cause of action").
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compensation policy. Dean Kay comments that if defendant raised the
choice-of-law issue, there12 might be a "constitutional objection" to the
application of forum law.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts" is a good example of the waste of
resources resulting from using the Constitution to block application of
forum law without first requiring a party to demonstrate that the law
of some other jurisdiction produces a different result. In a class action
in Kansas, the Kansas courts applied Kansas law to determine the
interest owed by Phillips on royalty payments that it withheld from
owners of natural gas fields.' 4 The Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to apply Kansas law to the rights of royalty recipients in other
states. 15 Justice Stevens objected that there was no showing that the
other states in which there were gas leases would have reached a
different result, and therefore, "[tihere is simply no demonstration here
that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision has impaired the legitimate
interests of any other States .

..

."

Justice Stevens was right. On

remand, the Kansas courts decided that in the absence of clear precedent
to the contrary in the other states, the judges there would probably be
as fair and wise as the Kansas judges and require the same amount of
interest on suspended royalties as ordered in the remanded case.' 7
This time the Supreme Court denied certiorari.'"
In Walton, the laws of all the United States jurisdictions that had
contacts with the parties were identical on the key issue of whether the
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was responsible for its
employee's negligence.' 9 As the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws states in one of its most sensible provisions, "[wihen certain
contacts involving a tort are located in two or more states with identical
local law rules on the issue in question, the case will be treated for
choice-of-law purposes as if these contacts were grouped in a single
state."20 Under modem conflicts analysis, ARAMCO might argue that
Saudi law should be applied so that ARAMCO can play on a level field
with companies from outside the United States that do business in Saudi

12. Transcript, supra note 6, at 646.
13. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
14. See id. at 799.
15. Id. at 823.
16. Id. at 836 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Kan. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1223 (1988).

18. Id.
19. See Walton, 233 F.2d at 546.
20.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

RESTATEMENT].

§

145 cmt. i (1971) [hereinafter
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Arabia. First, however, it should behoove ARAMCO to demonstrate that
Saudi law would not permit recovery. ARAMCO's access to experts on
Saudi law should make it easy for ARAMCO to present proof that under
that law "responsibility for human action is individual and ... there can
be no vicarious liability."21 The mystery is why ARAMCO did not do
so, relying instead on the long process that finally resulted in dismissing
plaintiff's claim on the merits for his inability to prove the content of
Saudi law.22
It is not unfair to apply New York law if that law reaches the same
result as the laws of Delaware, where the company was incorporated,
and Arkansas, where plaintiff was domiciled. Reich v. Purcell23 was a
suit by recently-arrived California residents against a long-time
California resident for the wrongful death of family members in an
automobile collision in Missouri. Missouri had a twenty-five thousand
dollar cap on recovery, but California did not limit recovery and neither
did Ohio, the former residence of plaintiffs. At the time of the collision,
plaintiffs "were on their way to California, where [they] were contemplating settling."' Justice Roger Traynor refused to take plaintiffs'
move to California into account in his interest calculus because this
might lead to "forum shopping."25 Perhaps "domicile shopping" might
be a better term in this context. He rejected Missouri law on the ground
that Missouri did not have."any substantial interest ... in extending the
benefits of its limitation of damages to travelers from states having no
similar limitation."" He could then have stated that further analysis
was not necessary because California and Ohio law were identical,27
but instead he applied the law of Ohio where plaintiffs resided at the
time of the collision.2" Was the application of Ohio law unfair to
defendant, who had no contact with that state? Traynor's short and
cogent answer was, "a] defendant cannot reasonably complain when
compensatory damages are assessed in accordance with the law of his
domicile and plaintiffs receive no more than they would have had they
been injured at home."2 9

21. Wade F. Hyder, Choice of Tort Law in Enclaves Established by United States
Corporationsfor ExpatriateEmployees, 11 HASTINGS INV'L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 82 (1987).
22. See Walton, 233 F.2d at 546.
23. 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967).
24. Id. at 728.
25. Id. at 730.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 731.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See Reich, 432 P.2d at 731.
Id.

1997]

COMMENTS

875

The worst thing a court can do is to raise the choice-of-law issue on its
own motion and then decide it without adequate briefing and argument.
James v. Powell"0 is a good example of what to avoid. Plaintiff had
recovered a libel judgment against Congressman Adam Clayton Powell.
Powell and his wife owned land in Puerto Rico, which the wife transferred to relatives. Plaintiff then sued Powell and his wife for harm
caused by this fraudulent conveyance and recovered compensatory and
punitive damages. All parties were content to have the case decided
under forum law, but the New York Court of Appeals would not allow
the parties to overlook "[t]he rule ...

that the validity of a conveyance

of a property interest is governed by the law of the place where the
property is located."3 ' The court then speculated that Puerto Rican law
might not permit attachment of the land or, if attachment were possible,
that law might allow plaintiff to ignore the fraudulent conveyance and
proceed against the property. 2 So far so good. These facets of Puerto
Rican law simply determine whether plaintiff has in fact been harmed,
what Brainerd Currie would refer to as a "datum."3 It might be
preferable for Puerto Rico to apply New York law to determine whether
the New York debtor's real estate is exempt from execution by his New
York judgment creditor,34 but what Puerto Rico does is controlling on
this issue.
Next, however, the court's logic jumps the tracks. If plaintiff did have
a right initially to proceed against the land and that right was frustrated, "her remedy, if any, must arise under the law of Puerto Rico."35 No,
given the fact of harm, there is as much reason why New York law
should determine the remedy as in Babcock v. Jackson," in which the
court held that New York law afforded a cause of action by a guest
passenger against a host driver although the law of the place of injury
would not.37 In James, the court did find that "New York has the
'strongest interest' in the protection of its judgment creditors and,
accordingly, New York law should govern as to whether the judgment

30. 225 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1967).
31. Id. at 745.
32. See id.
33. See Currie, supra note 6, at 1020.
34. See UNIF. EXEMPTIONS ACT § 3(a), 13 U.L.A. 218 (1986) (stating that "[nlonresidents
are entitled to the exemptions provided by the law of the jurisdiction of their residence");
cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 132 (stating that forum law determines exemptions
unless another state, such as the common domicile of creditor and debtor, "has the
dominant interest in the question of exemption").
35. James, 225 N.E.2d at 745.
36. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
37. See id. at 284.
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debtor's conduct... warrant[ed] an award of punitive damages." 38 The
same could be said of compensatory damages. Then, having instructed
the parties on choice of law, the court remanded for application of Puerto
Rican law to compensatory damages.3" Thus, the court raised the
choice-of-law issue on its own motion, proceeded to decide it, and made
a hash of it.
I agree with David Currie that "in an adversary system" 40 the court
should not raise the choice-of-law issue on its own motion. A civil law
jurisdiction is governed by the motto jura novit curia, the court knows
the law, and the judge is expected to take an active role in shaping the
presentation of the case.41 Although there is disagreement among
scholars whether "jura"includes foreign law,42 a civil law judge is likely
to raise the choice-of-law issue on her own motion and assist the parties
in properly briefing and arguing the issue..
III.

43

GRANT V. MCAULIFFE

Dean Kay raises the question of why, when two cars collide, as they
did in Grant v. McAuliffe, the application of the place-of-injury rule
44
denying recovery "depends so heavily on the residence of the parties."
She asks whether the rule produced by interest analysis "is a common
domicile rule."45 Professor Laycock has gone so far as to state that if
residents of the same state are in the same automobile which crashes in
another state, it would be permissible to apply the law of their common
domicile, but if two strangers who happen to share the same domicile

38. James, 225 N.E.2d at 747. The court held that New York law did not permit
punitive damages. Id.
39. See id. at 745.
40. Transcript, supra note 6, at 650.
41. See David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1815 (1988) (stating that
"German judges have a duty, reinforced by the principle jura novit curia, to know and be
bound by the appropriate legal rule without prompting from the parties").
42. See Detlev Vagts & Betinio Diamant, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 544, 545
(1987) (stating that "juranovit curiadoes not apply" to foreign law and disagreeing on this
point with the author of the book reviewed).
43. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953). Two California residents collided while driving in Arizona.
After the death of one of the drivers, plaintiffs sued his estate in California for
compensation for injuries caused by the collision. Under Arizona law the cause of action
would not survive the tortfeasor's death, but it did survive under California law. Judge
Traynor applied California law on the ground that it was procedural. See id. at 946.
44. Transcript, supra note 6, at 659.
45. Id. at 660.
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collide in another state, the Constitution requires application of the law
of the place of injury.4
Professor Laycock's position was certainly news to the authors of a
popular casebook.4 7 Grant v. McAuliffe is a principal case in their book.
In editions before Laycock's article was published, the editorial summary
of the facts simply referred to "an Arizona automobile accident" without
revealing whether one or more cars were involved.4
Following
Professor Laycock's article, the authors inserted in the current edition
the vital information that Pullen's death was the "result of the collision
of two automobiles." 9
The reason Justice Roger Traynor reached the right result in Grant v.
McAuliffe was that only California would bear the long-range consequences of holding Pullen's estate liable for the injuries he inflicted in
Arizona. A common domicile rule is not 'desirable because such a rule
masks the difference between false and true conflicts and sometimes
gives us the wrong answer. This is illustrated by a sequence of three
Wisconsin cases.
In Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.," a
Wisconsin husband was driving in California with his wife as passenger
when his negligence caused an accident that injured his wife. At that
time, California did not permit spouses to sue one another for negligent
injury, but Wisconsin did. In a landmark opinion, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin overruled a long line of cases"' that had applied the law
of the place of injury in these circumstances and the court applied
Wisconsin law instead.52 The court accomplished this feat by recharacterizing the cause of action as "a matter of family law rather than tort
law [that] should be governed by the law of the domicile."53
Three years later the court revisited choice of law for marital
immunity in a significantly different factual context. In Haynie v.

46. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 324 (1992) (stating that if "two
strangers from Wisconsin collide on a Minnesota highway ...there is no basis to apply any
law but Minnesota's").
47. MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 493 (10th
ed. 1996).
48. See WILLIS L.M. REESE & MAURICE ROSENBERG, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONFLICT

OF LAWS 455 (8th ed. 1984); WILLIS L.M. REESE ET AL., CASES &MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS 465 (9th ed. 1990).
49. See MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 493
(10th ed. 1996).
50. 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959).
51. Id. at 818.

52. See id.
53.

Id. at 817.
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Hanson,54 an Illinois wife was injured when her husband collided in
Wisconsin with a Wisconsin driver. The wife sued the Wisconsin driver,
and he impleaded the husband's liability insurer for contribution.
Illinois, but not Wisconsin, had a rule of marital immunity for tort. The
court stuck to its domicile guns and affirmed dismissal of the Wisconsin
defendant's cross-complaint. 55
The problem with this result is that this time the policies of the place
of injury, not as place of injury but as defendant's domicile, are relevant.
Wisconsin had an interest in permitting its resident to obtain what it
regarded as equitable contribution, thus lessening his liability and, not
incidentally, reducing the loss history of a car principally garaged in
Wisconsin and, consequently, reducing Wisconsin liability insurance
rates. 6 The interests of the husband's residence, Illinois, in marital
immunity were, if not eliminated, at least greatly attenuated. The two
reasons that Illinois might impose marital immunity for tort were to
prevent collusive recoveries against a spouse's liability insurer, thus
reducing liability insurance rates, and to prevent domestic discord.57
Collusion and domestic strife were less likely in Haynie than if the wife
had sued her husband. It was the Wisconsin driver who dragged the
husband's liability insurer into court for contribution. If there were any
suspicion that this was a Machiavellian conspiracy to get at the
husband's liability insurance because the Wisconsin driver is underinsured, the scheme can be frustrated by permitting the Wisconsin driver
to receive contribution only after he has paid more than his proper share
of the judgment.
Another six years passed before the Wisconsin court recognized that
the rigid domicile rule was capable of doing mischief just as the rigid
place-of-wrong rule had. The court in Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel
Co."' applied "interest analysis" and permitted the Wisconsin defendant

54. 114 N.W.2d 443 (Wis. 1962).
55. See id. at 444.
56. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 156 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Wis. 1968) (stating
that the Wisconsin rule of contribution is designed "to promote the spreading of the risk
and fasten liability in torts on a moral basis of fault").
57. See id. (stating the policy of interspousal immunity "rest[s] on the proposition that
family peace is promoted thereby and perhaps as a by-product collusive suits are held to
a minimum"). These policies are speculative. In actual litigation, whether one or both of
these policies underlay the Illinois rule would be determined by careful study of the
legislative history of any statutes involved and of any Illinois cases discussing the reasons
for marital immunity. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict
of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178 (stating that we should determine a statute's territorial
reach by the same process used to determine "how a statute applies in time, and how it
applies to marginal domestic situations").
58. 156 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. 1968).
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to obtain contribution in circumstances similar to Haynie." The court
repented that in Haurmschild ° it had substituted for the place-of-wrong
rule "another universal mechanical rule ...

which required the

application of the law of the domicile. " All this did not prevent the
New York Court of Appeals, four years after Zelinger, from adopting a
common-domicile rule for guest-statute cases.62 Oh well, you can't
expect New York judges to read cases from a hick state like Wisconsin.
IV. BABCOCK V. JACKSON63

I do not agree with Dean Kay "that Georgia is better off not to have
[legislative history] because the Georgia judges, then, won't be as
distracted maybe as some of the other judges will be" in attempting to
find the purpose of a statute as part of interest analysis for choice of
Dean Kay refers to Professor Brilmayer's contention that
law."
interest analysts are not really concerned with legislative intention
because they would not follow a specific legislative direction concerning
the geographical reach of legislation if the statute required application
of the law of a state that had no "interest" in the resolution of the controversy.n

59. Id. at 470. This analysis was through a Leflar lens. The court adopted as
"guidelines... A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate and international
order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; D. Advancement of the forum's governmental
interests; E. Application of the better rule of law." Id. at 469 (citing Robert Leflar, ChoiceInfluencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,282 (1966)). The court
applied Wisconsin law as "the better law." Id. at 473.
60. 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959), discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
61. Zelinger, 156 N.W.2d at 468.
62. See Neumeier v. Kushner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (N.Y. 1972) (stating that "[wihen
the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the car is
there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of care
which the host owes to his guest").
63. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). A New Yorker was driving his automobile in Ontario
when he lost control and struck a stone wall. His passenger, also a New Yorker, was
injured. The passenger sued the driver to recover for her injuries. Ontario law did not
permit a guest passenger to sue her host driver, but there was liability under New York
law. The court applied New York law stating that "Cclomparison of the relative 'contacts'
and 'interests' of New York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-&-vis the issue here
presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and
more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal." Id. at 284.
64. Transcript, supra note 6, at 671.
65. See Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge,
35 MERCER L. REV. 555, 558 (1984) (stating that if a state statute has a choice-of-law
provision requiring the application of that statute in certain circumstances "[s]urely
'statutory construction' [in which interest analysts purport to engage] compels the finding
of an interest (of that state in applying its statute]"); Id. at 560 (stating that no
"mainstream interest analyst would say that [the state] can be shown to have an 'interest'
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Legislative history can be useful in determining the policies that a
statute has implemented. These policies determine whether a state is
"interested" in having its law applied; otherwise one of those policies will
be subverted. A choice-of-law clause requiring application of the statute
when no purpose underlying the statute will'be served is not an
expression of a state "interest" in the sense relevant to functional
conflicts analysis.
Legislative history is not equal in quality. A section-by-section analysis
intended to facilitate legislators' understanding of the enactment and
drafted by the committee that voted out the statute is likely to be
reliable. A question from the floor during debate asking how the statute
would apply in a specific circumstance and answered by one of the bill's
sponsors may be another matter entirely, particularly if inquiry reveals
that the questioner had the interests of a client in mind when asking the
question and that the answer had been prearranged to obtain the
support of the questioner. Of course that never happens, does it?
Moreover, just because legislative history states that a statute is
designed to serve a certain purpose, it does not mean that courts in
other states must find the purpose credible or yield their interests to
that of the enacting state. Suppose, for example, Alabama added a
provision to its guest statute" stating that it applied whenever the
injury occurred in Alabama because the purpose of the statute was to
protect owners and drivers from ungrateful guests, and that this
protection was extended not only to Alabama residents but also to all
who visit Alabama. That would bind Alabama courts, but courts of other
states should feel free to permit recoveries in cases like Babcock v.
Jackson.7 The interest that Alabama asserts pales in comparison to
the interest of the domicile of host and guest in assuring adequate
compensation to its injured residents or their surviving dependents. If
we could trust the United States Supreme Court to micromanage choice

[if the only basis for an interest is the statutory choice-of-law clause]").
66. ALA. CODE § 32-1-2 (1975) (requiring "willful or wanton misconduct" before an
owner or operator of a motor vehicle is liable for injury or death of a guest passenger).
67. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). For a statement of the case, see supra note 63.
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of law, which we cannot," Alabama would be told to desist from such
an officious assertion of an interest.
V.

SCHULTZ v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC. s 9

Dean Kay states that interest analysis is vulnerable to forum
shopping. 70 Any method of choice of law, unless uniformly applied by
all possible forums, will lead to forum shopping if plaintiff attorneys are
doing their jobs. Basic litigation tactics require the attorney to
determine all jurisdictions in which the plaintiff can sue the defendant,
the laws of these jurisdictions, and whether each jurisdiction will apply
its own law or the law of some other place. A perfectly good case can be
kicked down the sewer by suing in the wrong forum.
In re Air CrashDisasterat Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973,"'
is a good example. New Hampshire residents who had purchased

68. We do not want the same folks who have made a mess of personal jurisdiction to
do the same with choice of law. For a jurisdictional masterpiece, see, for example,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984) (denying
jurisdiction over a Colombian helicopter company that killed United States workers in Peru
and that had extensive business contacts with the forum, relying on Rosenberg Bros. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), which was decided 22 years before International
Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310 (1945), ushered in a new jurisdictional regime). It
is just as well that the Court allows states to do pretty much what they will with choice
of law. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (permitting Minnesota to apply
its law to construction of an insurance policy issued in Wisconsin to a Wisconsin resident
and thus increase compensation for death caused in Wisconsin). In the past 50 years, only
one full opinion by the Court held unconstitutional a state's application of its own law, and
in that case it did not make any difference what law applied. See Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes 13-18. The last
opinion before Phillips Petroleum to declare choice of law unconstitutional was Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). In 1981, the Court affirmed
without opinion an Eighth Circuit decision holding application of Missouri law unconstitutional. McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.), affd mem., 454
U.S. 1071 (1981).
69. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). Two New Jersey brothers were members of a Boy
Scout troop. The scoutmaster was a Catholic priest who also was a teacher at a parochial
school attended by the brothers. The scoutmaster took the brothers to a camp in New York
where he sexually abused them. Both boys suffered emotionally and one committed
suicide. The boys' parents sued the Boy Scouts and the Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis,
an Ohio corporation, that supplied teachers for the New Jersey school attended by the boys.
The Boy Scouts were headquartered in New Jersey when the abuse in New York occurred,
but then moved to Texas. Under New Jersey law, the Brothers of the Poor and the Boy
Scouts were entitled to charitable immunity for the harm caused by the priest, but they
had no immunity under New York law. The court applied New Jersey law and affirmed
summary judgment for defendants. See id. at 681.
70. Transcript, supra note 6, at 676.
71. 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
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airplane tickets in New Hampshire and boarded the craft there were
killed when the airplane crashed in Massachusetts. Some of the
wrongful death suits were filed in federal district court in New
Hampshire and some in federal district court in Massachusetts. All
actions were consolidated in federal district court in Massachusetts for
coordinated pretrial proceedings.72 At that time, Massachusetts had a
$200,000 statutory limit on wrongful death recovery and a Massachusetts court would apply Massachusetts law as that of the place of
injury. 3 New Hampshire had no statutory limit on recovery and a
New Hampshire court would apply the law of that state based on five
factors, including "advancement of the forum-state's governmental
interests" and "the sounder rule of law."74 The Court in Van Dusen v.
Barrack'6 had held that when a case is transferred from one federal
district court to another in a different state, the transferee court applies
the conflictsrules of the transferor state.76 The Massachusetts federal
district court therefore ruled that New Hampshire law applied to those
claimants whose actions were first filed in New Hampshire, 7 but
Massachusetts law, including its cap on damages, applied to those
actions filed there.78
Professor David Currie states that if a court using interest analysis
decided that its law does not apply to a multistate occurrence, "there's
an argument" that courts in other states should follow this definitive
ruling on the sister state's interest and not apply the law of that state
to similar fact situations.79 The decision of a court applying interest
analysis that its law does not apply is an expression of that state's
"interest in a given matter, and of the intensity of that interest."8°
Again, other courts are free to decide that the reasoning of the judges in
their sister state is insufficiently cogent and come to a different
conclusion."
An example is provided by cases dealing with New York's statute of
frauds for agreements to assist a client in locating companies with whom
the client can engage in mergers and acquisitions. New York courts

72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
73. Air Crash at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1108.
74. Id. at 1113. This five-factor analysis used by the New Hampshire courts was
proposed by Professor Leflar. See Leflar, supra note 59, at 282.
75. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
76. See id. at 639.
77. See Air Crash at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1115.
78. See id. at 1116.

79. Transcript, supra note 6, at 681-84.
80.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 8 cmt. k.

81.

See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.

19971

COMMENTS

883

have applied this statute of frauds to prevent New York brokers from
recovering on oral contracts with clients from other states. Moreover,
New York courts have done so even though the clients' states would
enforce these unwritten agreements.8 2 The reason that the New York
Court of Appeals gave for applying the New York statute to prevent
recovery by New York brokers was that "New York is a national and
international center for the purchase and sale of businesses," 3 and
invalidating oral brokerage contracts "encourages the use of New York
brokers and finders by foreign principals."84 This puffing made the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court gag; thus, unlike the New York
Court of Appeals, it permitted a New York broker to recover on an oral
contract with a Massachusetts client.88
David Currie states that he does not think that "the better law
approach has any applicability to the conflict of laws." 8 He believes
that if a court disfavors its own state's statute, the court violates the
"separation of powers" between the court and the legislature. 7 If the
disfavored local rule is judge-made, the court should simply overrule it
for all cases, domestic as well as interstate. 88
Sometimes, when there is a true conflict of state interests, the law of
one of the states is, when compared with the law of other states,
anachronistic or aberrational. States might well adopt, as a "just"89
method of resolving disputes, a rule that clashes of state policy should
be resolved by rejecting the law that is objectively anachronistic. Many
distinguished conflicts scholars have advocated a'better-law approach to
resolving conflict problems. °
Moreover, outside of the tort area there is wide acceptance of the
proposition that a court should reject forum statutory law when that law

82. See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1969).
83. Id. at 582.
84. Id. at 583.
85. Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting "the
Empire State's imperial reach").
86. Transcript, supra note 6, at 683-84.
87. Id. at 682.
88. Id. at 682-83.
89. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971) (discussing the concept of the
"original position" under which a person selects principles of justice without knowing how
the principles will affect the selector).
90. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 195
(1993) (advocating choice of the law that best reflects modern trends and doctrine); Elliott
Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 980
(1952) (referring to "a situation in which one of the possibly applicable laws is in tune with
the times and the other is thought to drag on the coat tails of civilization"); Leflar, supra
note 59, at 282 (referring to "[a]pplication of the better rule of law").

884

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

would discourage interstate and international commercial transactions.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts reflects long-established case
law9 ' when it validates a contract "against the charge of usury if it
provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the
contract has a substantial relationship."92 Even on the sensitive
subject of small loans made for personal purposes, the Uniform Small
Loan Law93 enforces loans lawfully made in another state under a
small loan law "similar in principle" to the forum's act."
VI.

LILIENTHAL V. KAUFMAN95

Dean Kay states that Professor Baxter proposed his "comparative
impairment" method of resolving true conflicts only for an impartial
"federal court."" Professor Baxter contended that federal constitutional
law, as interpreted and applied by federal courts, should control choice
of law by rejecting the law of the state "whose internal objective will be
least impaired in general scope and impact by subordination in cases
like the one at hand."97 He did recommend that "every state ...

as a

matter of state law, adopt the comparative impairment principle," but
did not think that this was constitutionally mandated.98
I believe that the comparative impairment method is of very limited
use in resolving true conflicts. In only rare true conflict cases will an
objective observer conclude that the policies of one state will clearly be
less impaired than those of another. The most likely situation in which
comparative impairment is a useful method of resolving conflicts is that
in which the law of one state protects the policy underlying the law of
the other, but the law of the second state would completely frustrate the

91. See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403,407-08 (1927) (approving
a rule that refers either to the law of the place of contracting or the law of the place of
performance to validate a loan agreement against a charge of usury).
92. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 203.
93. For the history of this law, see FRANK BROOKES HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON
SMALL LOAN LAws 192-93 (1938).
94. UNIF. SMALL LOAN LAW § 18 (6th draft 1935), reprinted in HUBACHEK, supra note
93, at 111.
95. 395 P.2d 543 (Or, 1964). A California creditor made a business loan in California
to a resident of Oregon. The borrower promised to repay the loan in California. When the
borrower defaulted, the creditor sued him in Oregon. The court applied Oregon law under
which a guardian for the "spendthrift" borrower had declared the obligation void. See id.
at 543-44.
96. Transcript, supra note 6, at 695.

97. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18
(1963).
98. Id. at 42.
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purposes of the first state's law. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v.
Golden" affords an example. A New Yorker incurred a gambling debt
at a casino in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican law permitted the casino to
recover the debt in court, but New York law invalidated the obligation.
The court enforced the debt, noting that New York law was designed to
protect "the family man of meager resources from his own imprudence
at the gaming tables.""° The court noted that "Puerto Rico has made
provision for this kind of imprudence by allowing the court to reduce
gambling obligations or even decline to enforce them altogether, if the
court in its discretion finds that the losses" threaten the welfare of the
gambler's family.1" 1 The court, thus, felt free to follow its "consistent
practice of enforcing rights validly created by the laws of a sister State
which do not tend to disturb our local laws or corrupt the public."0 2
In most cases, which state's policies will be "more impaired" if not
applied will be in the eye of the beholder. An opinion by a court in one
state preferring its own law under this method can be rewritten to reach
the opposite result by simply switching the names of the two states and
03
is
making a few other minor changes. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club"
a good example. The court held a Nevada casino civilly liable under
California law for getting a Californian drunk and thus contributing to
his maiming a California motorcyclist on a California highway.'
Nevada law did not impose civil liability on the liquor seller. The court
used the "comparative impairment" method to choose California law.'05
The opinion stated that "California's interest would be very significantly
impaired if its policy were not applied to defendant,""° but that
"Nevada's interest in protecting its tavern keepers from civil liability...
will not be significantly impaired when as in the instant case liability is
imposed only on those tavern keepers who actively solicit California
business."' 7 A Nevada court applying the identical method might
reach the opposite result by concluding that California's compensation
policy "will not be significantly impaired when as in the instant case
liability is [denied] only [for] those tavern keepers who [serve liquor to
drunks who manage to reach California before injuring someone].""°

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964).
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 214.
546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976).
See id. at 725.
See id. at 723-25.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
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ROSENTHAL V. WARREN' 09

The panelists raised the issue of whether New York had sufficient
contacts with defendants and their course of conduct to make it fair to
impose New York law on them."' Unfairness in choice of law ranges
over a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, application of forum law
is so outrageous that it would violate due process. At the other extreme,
it is patently fair to apply forum law. The Second Circuit opinion in
Rosenthal states several circumstances in which New York law might be
applied to wrongful death elsewhere, but apparently does not realize
that the examples fall at different points on this fairness spectrum:
One might well inquire whether it would be anomalous to permit Dr.
Rosenthal's heirs to recover without damage limitation if he died in a
plane crash en route to Boston's Logan International Airport (Kilberg
[v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961)]) or in a taxi cab
from Logan to New England Baptist (Miller [v. Miller, 237 N.E.2d 877
(N.Y. 1968)]) but not once he stepped into the hospital itself.'

It is fair to apply New York law to the airline. The New York decedent
purchased his ticket in New York and boarded the airplane there for a
round trip that was to end back in New York. The taxicab example is the
one that poses the most unfairness because, except for knowing that his
fares are likely to be residents of other states, the driver has no reason
to foresee that his conduct will cause effects in New York. Even if he
could foresee New York effects, I suspect that most persons who have not
had their minds clouded by a legal education would find it outrageous

109. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973). A New Yorker was operated on in a Massachusetts
hospital and died there. The decedents' executrix sued the doctor who performed the
operation and the hospital in federal district court in New York. Plaintiff obtained
jurisdiction over the doctor by attaching his malpractice insurance. See id. at 439-40. The
United States Supreme Court subsequently held this method of obtaining jurisdiction a
violation of due process. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Plaintiff obtained
jurisdiction over the hospital by serving a hospital officer while he was soliciting funds in
New York. See 475 F.2d 439-40. Service on an officer of a company while in the forum is
not a basis for jurisdiction over the company. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (stating that "it has been generally recognized that the casual
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities
in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action
unconnected with the activities there"); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAws 329 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "mere presence within the state of an agent of the

corporation, or even a principal officer, is insignificant as a basis for jurisdiction").
Massachusetts law limited wrongful death recovery to $50,000, but New York had no limit.
The court applied New York law. See 475 F.2d at 439.
110. Transcript, supra note 6, at 702-04.
111. Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 443-44.
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to apply New York law to the cabby. It is fairer to apply New York law
to the hospital and doctor because they treat persons from all over the
world and know that Rosenthal hales from New York and has dependents there who will not receive adequate compensation if a court
applies the Massachusetts limit on wrongful death recovery. Nevertheless, reasonable persons might disagree as to whether it was fair to
apply New York law in Rosenthal."2 A court has not done its job if it
applies the law of a state on the ground that this application will effect
that state's policies, but has failed to note that the state has no contact
with the defendant or the defendant's course of conduct that would make
it reasonable to impose its law on the defendant.
David Currie states that we should use the same choice-of-law
analysis for international as for interstate cases and gives as an example
determining the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
law. 1 ' This is consistent with his view that courts should take a
unilateral approach to choice of law and apply forum law whenever
forum policies are affected." 4 I prefer forum-neutral solutions to the
true conflict and would not use antitrust law as an example when
comparing techniques in interstate and international cases. For most
civil litigation between private parties involving the ordinary substantive
law of subjects such as torts and contracts, I agree that the same
techniques used in interstate cases should be applied to resolve both true
and false conflicts in international transactions. The reason that I
would not use antitrust law as an example is that public law is involved.
There is far more justification for a United States court taking a
unilateral approach to the application of United States public law than
to the application of private law. Public law triggers strong national
policies, and differences in the public law of countries are not likely to
be resolved by neutral criteria such as "better law."" 5 I favor a
presumption that United States antitrust law applies to conduct abroad
whenever that conduct foreseeably causes consequences here that our
law is designed to prevent."16 There is, nevertheless, a spectrum of

112. See Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1605
(1978) (stating that Rosenthal was wrongly decided and may violate due process).
113. Transcript, supra note 6, at 709-10.
114. Id. at 683.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94..
116. See Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and
Security Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law"Approach, 70 TEX.L. REV.
1799, 1829 (1992). The presumption is rebutted in the rare case in which the effects in the
United States are not sufficiently serious to warrant frustrating the foreign governmental
policy that permits those effects. An example is ConsolidatedGold FieldPLC v. Minorco,
S.A., 871 F.2d 252, amended, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989), in which United States residents

888

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

suggested approaches to the extraterritorial application of public law,
ranging from purely unilateral" 7 to refusal to apply our law to events
abroad unless application is expressly mandated by the relevant
legislation."'

VIII. ERWIN v. THOMAS" 9 AND HURTADO V. SUPERIOR COURT OF
SACRAMENTO COUNTY2 '
I put these two opinions together because they both present the socalled "no interest" case of plaintiff's law favorable to defendant and
defendant's law favorable to plaintiff. In my view, they pose identical
problems because I do not find it relevant that in Hurtado the injury
occurred in defendant's state, whereas in Erwin it occurred in plaintiff's
state. The difference would be material only if civil liability were likely
to deter negligent driving. If you think that drivers say to themselves,
"Gee, I'd better slow down, this state doesn't have any limits on wrongful
death recovery," so be it. I prefer a more cogent basis for applying the
law favorable to plaintiff and would find it in both cases. The driver's
state has an interest in assuring that, through the device of liability
insurance, its citizens are responsible loss distributors. It should not be

held only 2.5% of the shares of a foreign company that was the target of a hostile takeover.
The tender offer complied with all foreign requirements but not United States regulations.
Id. at 254 n.1. The Second Circuit, I believe incorrectly, enjoined the tender offer
1
worldwide. See 871 F.2d. at 263.
117. See Michael P. Scharf, Case Two: ExtraterritorialApplicationof United States Law
Against United States and Alien Defendants (ShermanAct), 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 577, 621
(1995) (favoring "a unilateral assessment of the strength of the United States interest in
the extraterritorial application of its law").
118. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "ifthe question were not governed by precedent, it would be worth
considering whether that presumption [against extraterritorial application] controls the
outcome here").
119. 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973). An Oregon resident, while driving in Washington in the
course of his employment, injured a Washington resident. The victim's wife sued for loss
of consortium, a remedy permitted under Oregon law, but not under Washington law. See
id. at 494-95. Concluding that "neither state has a vital interest in the outcome of this
litigation," the court applied Oregon law on the ground that this was the natural result in
an Oregon court and would not offend any Washington policy. Id. at 496-97.
120. 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974). A Mexican citizen was killed in a traffic accident in
California. The court applied California law to permit much greater recovery than would
be possible under the law of the Mexican state where the decedent had been domiciled.
See id. at 668. The court found that California had an interest in deterring negligent
conduct on its highways but that Mexico had no interest in limiting the recovery of its
citizens against California defendants. See id. at 670.
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so callous as to limit this interest to injuries to its own citizens or within
its own state.' 2 '
I take a different view of enterprise liability. When manufacturer's
law is favorable to plaintiff and plaintiff's law is favorable to manufacturer, a court should apply the law of plaintiff's residence if liability is
asserted on the basis of strict liability or negligence. Otherwise,
manufacturers in a state with law favorable to recovery will be put at a
competitive disadvantage when compared with manufacturers from other
jurisdictions that do business in plaintiff's state. 22 On the other hand,
if the manufacturer's conduct is sufficiently outrageous that its home
state might wish to punish and deter such activity, then the law of that
state should be applied to favor recovery by a nonresident injured
elsewhere. In such circumstances, it should make no difference whether
the law favorable to the nonresident is compensatory or punitive.
Higher recovery in either category will punish and deter outrageous
conduct.
IX.

CONCLUSION

It is refreshing to read the transcript of the Roundtable discussion and
realize anew that modern conflicts theory is characterized by straight
talk and useful insights into the purposes of choosing law. The
similarities in the approaches taken by the great majority of current
commentators are far more important than the differences. All agree
that law should be chosen with an eye on the consequences in an
attempt to work a maximum accommodation of the polices of the states
that have contacts with the parties and the transaction.
No matter what modern approach is taken, there is no need for ad hoc
analysis of each case anew. In time, and that time has probably already
come', enough sound, functional results are available to permit a
statement of rules. These rules, unlike the rules that have been
displaced by the conflicts revolution of the past thirty-five years, do not
stick pins in maps without regard to the content or purposes of the law
thus chosen. New rules should summarize the results of functional

121. Cf Labree v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 818 (R.I. 1973) (stating that "where a driver is
from a state which allows a passenger to recover for ordinary negligence, the plaintiff

should recover, no matter what the law of his residence or the place of the accident").
122. See Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 475 A.2d 648, 652 (N.J. Super. 1984)
(stating that applying New Jersey law to favor recovery by a North Carolina worker
injured by a machine manufactured in New Jersey "would have the undesirable
consequence of deterring the conduct of manufacturing operations in this state and would
likely result in an unreasonable increase in litigation and thereby unduly burden our
courts").
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analysis in a series of choice-of-law cases. There is nothing wrong with
rules, just with mindless rules, such as those in Neumeier v. Kuehner," that do not reflect the lessons taught by wise adjudications.

123. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972). For discussion of one of the Neumeier rules, see supra
note 62 and accompanying text.

